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
USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt Col Michael W. Ritz, ANG Special Assistant to Director of CPC or Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

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## USAF Counterproliferation Center Annual Conference

2-3 May 2002

**"Countering the Asymmetric Threat of NBC Warfare and Terrorism"**

held at the

**William F. Bolger Center for Leadership Development in Potomac, MD.**

Look for link to register On-Line and the proposed agenda at our web site above.

Click on **May 2-3, 2002 Conference.**

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19 April 2002

## **WMD Proliferation "Is a Threat We Will Not Ignore," U.S. Official Says**

### **Assistant Secretary Wolf at arms control conference**

"Weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and missiles constitute a clear and direct threat to U.S. forces deployed around the world, as well as to our allies and friends," according to Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation John Wolf.

Speaking April 19 at the 12th Annual International Arms Control Conference at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Wolf added, "It is a threat we will not ignore."

Wolf said that President Bush's characterization of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil ... describes a real phenomenon. There is cooperation among countries trying to acquire WMD."

Furthermore, he said this cooperation goes beyond those three regimes: "other countries also have clandestine programs to develop weapons of mass destruction; several of the WMD 'wannabes' now are exporting technology, making the risk they pose that much greater."

Wolf's speech focused on the following U.S. non-proliferation "challenges:"

- Securing fissile materials and stopping their production in the former Soviet Union [FSU];
- Stopping the spread of WMD and missiles;
- Protecting dangerous BW [biological weapons] pathogens in the FSU and destroying CW [chemical weapons] stockpiles in Russia;
- Capping nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and preventing any outward leakage;
- Reinforcing export controls, including on Iraq; and
- Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

**(Note: In the text, billion equals 1,000 million.)**

*Following is the text of Wolf's remarks, as prepared for delivery:*

**John S. Wolf**

**State Department Nonproliferation Bureau**

**Sandia National Laboratories 12th Annual International Arms Control Conference**

**April 19, 2002**

**Albuquerque, New Mexico**

**U.S. Approaches to Nonproliferation**

I would like to thank Sandia Laboratories' Dr. C. Paul Robinson [President and Laboratories Director], Dr. Roger Hagengruber [Senior Vice President, National Security Programs], Ms. Dori Ellis [Director, International Security Center], and Dr. James Brown [Organizer and Conference Chair] for organizing and supporting this conference. Nonproliferation is an international problem that can only be solved through international cooperation, so I am pleased to see representatives from some 30 countries here today. I would like to extend a special welcome to all of you.

As President Bush said on the six-month anniversary of the September 11 attacks:

"Every nation ... must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale -- terror armed with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. ... Some states that sponsor terror are seeking or already possess weapons of mass destruction; terrorist groups are hungry for these weapons, and would use them without a hint of conscience. These facts cannot be denied, and must be confronted. There is no margin for error, and no chance to learn from mistakes. (We) must act deliberately, but inaction is not an option."

It is no longer simply the threat that states pose, but also the threat that terrorists will acquire, and use, weapons of mass destruction. The discovery effort that has taken place in Afghanistan, for instance, shows how intent al-Qaida was on acquiring WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities. This should worry us all.

We should be concerned also by the ratcheting up in regional instability that comes from the spread of such weapons and their delivery systems. That's true in the Middle East; it's true in East Asia; and it's most clearly true today in South Asia. Weapons of mass destruction and missiles constitute a clear and direct threat to U.S. forces deployed around the world, as well as to our allies and friends. It is a threat we will not ignore.

President Bush in January [and again this week] spoke about the "axis of evil." There was an unstinting effort in the weeks following to parse his words and their implications. Let's be clear: the phrase describes a real phenomenon. There is cooperation among countries trying to acquire WMD. North Korea is prepared to sell missiles to any country with money to buy them. Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles - but it could not do it without help foreign help. Iraq is clandestinely diverting Oil for Food commodities, and smuggling in components that are helping it to reconstitute its weapons and missile capabilities, all in defiance of Resolution 687 and successor resolutions of the United Nations.

And it's not just North Korea, Iran and Iraq; other countries also have clandestine programs to develop weapons of mass destruction; several of the WMD "wannabes" now are exporting technology, making the risk they pose that much greater.

This is why the President has made it clear that halting proliferation is not just one among many objectives of U.S. foreign policy; it is a central framing element.

As a practical matter, for us, it means first we and our partners and friends need to step forward to strengthen, broaden and enforce the nonproliferation regimes and treaties that protect us all. The President has said countries must chose sides in this war; fence sitting isn't an option. Each of us must reconsider our cooperative activities in WMD-related areas and apply a higher standard of security against WMD first and foremost. Political accommodation, and commercial gains, cannot be overriding priorities.

For over a decade, the bulk of financial support for critical nonproliferation programs around the world has been provided by the United States. Between 1992 and 2001, for example, the U.S. spent \$6.2 billion on cooperative programs with the countries of the former Soviet Union. During the same period the EU and EU member states spent \$500 million, and Japan spent \$200 million, on similar programs. All of us need to increase our efforts, and we, for one, are doing that. For FY 2002 Congress appropriated \$1.1 billion; the Administration is requesting over a \$1.3 billion for FY 2003.

A myth has grown up over the last two years that this is a unilateralist administration. The facts belie that. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the bedrock of our nonproliferation policy. We want much more active enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]. We are working in a whole host of multilateral export control regimes. We seek early signature of an international code of conduct against the spread of ballistic missiles. We are working bilaterally with our friends to try to halt the spread of technologies and components that would aid the development of weapons of mass destruction.

But let me be clear -- we are prepared to act unilaterally to defend our interests when they are directly threatened.

Looking at some of the specifics, we see a number of key global nonproliferation challenges including:

- Securing fissile materials and stop their production in the former Soviet Union [FSU];
- Stopping the spread of WMD and missiles;
- Protecting dangerous BW pathogens in the FSU and destroy CW stockpiles in Russia;
- Capping nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and preventing any outward leakage;
- Reinforcing export controls, including on Iraq;
- Strengthening the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Secure fissile materials and stop their production in the Former Soviet Union

The United States is pursuing a wide array of cooperative programs in Russia and the new Eurasian republics to help safeguard the large quantities of excess WMD materials, systems and technology in Russia and the former Soviet republics. Our objective is not only to help them meet their arms control obligations, but also to control and dispose of excess WMD materials -- in particular excess fissile materials -- and to ensure that nuclear, biological and chemical weapon and missile expertise does not leak to states of concern and terrorist organizations.

The United States is also now speeding up Material Protection, Control and Accounting programs at up to 40 sites in the former Soviet Union. We want to reduce quantities and vulnerabilities of fissile materials, dispose of materials declared excess to defense needs, and secure material in fewer, consolidated sites. To further help prevent theft and diversion of the most proliferation-prone plutonium -- the weapon-grade material -- we are working to shut permanently Russia's three remaining production reactors. We are also seeking Russian and allied support for a more cost-efficient plutonium disposition program for excess stockpiles, and we are working with Kazakhstan to secure 300 metric tons of spent fuel -- containing three tons of weapons-grade plutonium -- from its BN-350 breeder reactor. We have an active program to return highly enriched uranium [HEU] to Russia, and convert HEU reactors to lower more proliferation resistant fuels.

### **Stop the spread of WMD and missiles**

We are working actively to curb Iran's ambitious nuclear weapons program, longstanding chemical/biological programs, and a rapidly increasing ballistic missile force. Its clandestine effort to produce fissile material is a particular worry. We should be under no illusions: Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons; it cannot do this without foreign help.

In 1997 China agreed to curtail nuclear cooperation with Iran. That principled stance is of great international significance. We have had an active but regrettably so far inconclusive dialogue with Russia on this issue. Enlisting the full cooperation of the Russian government in countering Iran's WMD efforts would lead to significant enhancements in the new long-term partnership Presidents Bush and Putin envisioned during meetings last year in Washington and Crawford. Stopping North Korea's exports to Iran and other proliferators is a key part of the agenda we wish to pursue with Pyongyang.

### **Secure dangerous BW pathogens in the FSU and destroy CW stockpiles in Russia**

Another priority is securing dangerous biological pathogens in the former Soviet Union and resuming assistance to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles in Russia. We are concerned about the rate at which Russia moving to comply with its obligations under the BWC and CWC. We need to find common ground on this issue.

We are also committed to the scientist redirection programs, which are designed to prevent former Soviet weapons experts from providing WMD and missile expertise to proliferators and terrorists, at the Science Centers in Moscow and Kiev. Let me express my thanks to the many Sandia scientists who have participated in science center projects and activities. Your contributions are important to the eventual redirection of the former Soviet weapon scientists participating in this program, as well as in its sister programs in DOE [Department of Energy] and DOD [Department of Defense].

More broadly we are discussing with allies an updated package to impede BW terrorism. It focuses on improved domestic regulations, storage and handling of pathogens nationally and in international trade.

### **Stop nuclear and missile proliferation in and from South Asia**

I spoke earlier about how WMD is regionally destabilizing. Nowhere is this more evident than in South Asia, where one million troops face off on the India-Pakistan border. The presence of WMD and missiles in the region has dramatically increased the danger of miscalculation during times of crisis, and the resulting regional instability magnifies the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.

While the recent sharp escalation in tension between India and Pakistan has reminded us all of the pressing danger of unchecked proliferation, it is not clear that Pakistan and India have yet drawn the right conclusions from this crisis about the danger their WMD and missiles pose. We hope that confidence-building measures like keeping weapons and delivery systems separated, halting fissile material production, and restraining nuclear and missile programs can be implemented. Tightened export controls are also vital to ensure that India and Pakistan do not become a source for sensitive materials and technology.

### **Strengthen export controls, including on Iraq**

All efforts to secure existing WMD-related items will be futile if we are not able to cut off the flow of arms and sensitive WMD/missile technologies through strengthened export control.

We urgently need to strengthen the administration and effective enforcement of export controls on a multilateral basis. Without broad cooperation among export and transit countries, sensitive dual-use items and technologies cannot be effectively controlled. Foreign purchasers denied a critical item by one country can purchase it from another country that does not control its exports as stringently. Adherence to the guidelines and control lists of the multilateral export control regimes is vital to the success of our nonproliferation efforts.

Domestically, the Bush Administration is working with Congress on a new, comprehensive Export Administration Act that will be more responsive to the rapid pace of technological change and enhance our own export control enforcement authority. The U.S. is also expanding its Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance cooperation with other countries, particularly those in Central Asia, to help them strengthen their export control systems through improved laws, regulations, and licensing and enforcement efforts.

Strengthening and enforcement of export controls is particularly important in the case of Iraq. Iraq flaunts its hostility to the world; remains in violation of its U.N. and NPT obligations; supports terrorism; and is reconstituting its ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional military in contravention of UNSC [United Nations Security Council] resolutions.

We are working in the U.N. Security Council even as we meet to sharpen the U.N. efforts to deny Iraq the wherewithal to reconstitute its weapons programs. In UNSC Resolution 1382 the Security Council agreed to implement by May 30 a new export control system. This system will free up trade in goods for purely civilian use, but reinforce controls on militarily useful items. We expect a resolution embracing the new system to be voted in the Council this month.

## **Strengthen the IAEA**

Mindful of the world's near miss with Iraq, and new risks from countries like Iran and North Korea, we must improve and fund effective safeguards on nuclear power users and the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to ferret out covert weapons efforts. The Additional Safeguards Protocol sets an important new nonproliferation norm that every country should accept. The IAEA also has a central role in verifying the Agreed Framework.

But carrying out new tasks requires more resources. We need to ensure that the IAEA gets the financial, technical, and political support that it needs. The Board of Governors endorsed proposals to strengthen and expand IAEA programs for the worldwide protection of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and nuclear facilities against acts of terrorism. The United States strongly supports those initiatives and will urge member states to ensure that the IAEA has the resources needed to put them into practice.

## **Conclusion**

September 11 has given a new sense of urgency to a danger that we all have been concerned about for some time, and in that sense it provides an opportunity. The scope of these attacks has underlined the need to take vigorous action now to end the possibility that terrorist groups or rogue states could launch even more devastating attacks in the future. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an urgent and profound threat to the security of all states and requires urgent action.

The United States appreciates the cooperation and assistance the world community has shown in the campaign against the al-Qaida perpetrators of the September 11 attack and the Taliban regime that abetted the terrorists. But destroying al-Qaida will not end the threats to world security. We need to build on today's cooperation to move forward in strengthening nonproliferation efforts across the board. We have had clear warning of the enormous danger posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Repeating again President Bush's injunction -- "there is no margin for error. We will be deliberate, but inaction is not an option."

<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02041902.htm>

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Posted on Sun, Apr. 21, 2002

## **Army tests have Keys in uproar**

**BY JENNIFER BABSON**

[jbabson@herald.com](mailto:jbabson@herald.com)

**BOCA CHICA KEY** - They worry about allergies and immune system difficulties and ailments yet to be diagnosed.

A few bolted for points north; others shuttered windows and stayed inside.

Word that the U.S. Army was conducting biological and chemical detection tests off Key West last week -- using a crop duster to spray what it says are benign substances over a small swath of the Gulf -- set alarm bells ringing for some on this island chain.

"Monday I had my house closed up all day and the air conditioner running because I was concerned and I couldn't find out what was going on. The newspaper didn't say exactly where they were dropping," said Bill Eardley, a retiree who lives on Sugarloaf Key. "If I had known in advance, and I was concerned, I would have jumped in a car or plane and gotten out of here."

Using a small plane to release egg white powder, clay dust, ethanol, irradiated vegetable spores and a chemical compound commonly found in drugstore cosmetics -- all designed to simulate more ominous compounds -- Army and Environmental Protection Agency researchers were trying to determine whether civilian Doppler and drug interdiction radars can tell the difference between a raincloud carrying moisture and a cloud carrying something more ominous.

The experiments -- concluded last week -- were deemed a success, though the Army still says it needs to conduct an additional \$15 million to \$20 million worth of testing in the U.S.

Researchers are hoping software could be attached to civilian radars like those used by the National Weather Service to alert military and civilian authorities to unusual chemical or biological events or attacks.

But some locals greeted the tests themselves as a kind of preliminary attack.

"The weirdest thing I heard from a couple of people was that spores can travel 1,300 miles. They said that there was a spore release in Texas that arrived in Florida," said Mickey Morales, an Army spokesman who was on hand for the drill. "Some people have told me they have left the area or they have recommended to people that they leave the area."

It probably didn't help matters locally that the Pentagon went public with details of the tests less than a week before they began.

### **AN EXPOSE**

A few days earlier, a free Key West newspaper carried a front-page exposé on suspicious, Keys-photographed contrails that sources -- including an unnamed wife of a Navy service member -- insisted were actually "chemtrails" that could be the results of secret military experiments.

Some worried residents contacted the Army, the media, municipal officials, the EPA and U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson with their concerns -- prompting Nelson's Washington office to inquire about the nature of the tests, Morales said.

Last week, it was Morales' job to make the words "military experiment" seem palatable.

It was a challenge in some quarters.

"A lot of people have claimed they have read X, Y, and Z on the Internet," Morales said. "Somebody called me on his cell phone and wanted to know if it was OK to go boating."

Liz Holloway's neighbor on Sugarloaf Key "evacuated" to a place north of the Everglades when she heard the tests were imminent.

"She has chronic fatigue syndrome and thought it might exacerbate her condition," Holloway said. "Am I worried I am going to get sick 15 years from now? Maybe. But who knows?"

### **LITTLE NOTICE**

Holloway said she would have liked more advanced notice.

"My major problem was that I read the stuff in the newspaper and I called the agencies that were supposed to be responsible for the activity, and even their public information officers had no clue what was going on," she said. "I don't begrudge them that they have to do this kind of thing, but at least give us a choice to not be here."

Some in the Pentagon considered forgoing the public information campaign altogether, said Col. Stephen V. Reeves, program executive officer for the Chemical and Biological Defense program. Reeves was in the Keys Thursday to monitor testing.

"I received [a recommendation] from counsel, 'Maybe we should just go ahead,'" Reeves said. "I decided not to do that. If we had been quiet about it and somebody had suddenly discovered it, it would have confirmed everybody's worst suspicions."

The decision on how to publicize the tests apparently went all the way up the chain of command to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's office.

And so, last week, a steady parade of Keys residents was escorted to a blue tent pitched next to a government RV across U.S. 1 from the entrance to the Boca Chica Naval Air Field.

In an effort to allay local fears, Morales made a run to a local grocery, picking up an angelfood cake, Visine eyedrops and a mud mask of the kind used to combat acne -- all of which he said contained test ingredients.

"You can go to the supermarket and buy this stuff basically, except for the dead spores," he explained.

### **NOT SATISFIED**

The explanation didn't entirely satisfy Debora Edholm, the wife of local Navy employee who says she has seen and photographed hundreds of "chemtrails" of dubious origin.

Thursday afternoon, Edholm and a friend were escorted down a winding and wooded path, past a fence that's usually chained and beyond the sharp cries of a mother hawk to the blue tent where researchers were communicating by radio with pilots and radar operators involved in the testing.

Next to radio consoles, maps and computer equipment were jars containing examples of the compounds the Army dispersed in the tests.

"I have done a lot of research on what vitamin supplements to take to combat the chemtrails. I get exhausted," Edholm explained. "A lot of people down here are sick, you know. A lot of people think they are doing this to take out weak people. It's population control."

[http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/living/community/states/florida/counties/monroe\\_county/cities\\_neighborhoods/florida\\_keys/3106371.htm](http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/living/community/states/florida/counties/monroe_county/cities_neighborhoods/florida_keys/3106371.htm)

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## **Anthrax Spores Escape A Lab At Fort Detrick**

By Rick Weiss, Washington Post Staff Writer

Spores of the anthrax bacterium have been discovered in two areas of an Army research building at Fort Detrick, Md., and an Army scientist involved in research there has tested positive for exposure to the potentially deadly microbes, the Army said last night.

The scientist's exposure and the spread of the spores in the building appeared to be accidental and were not being treated as evidence of a crime or of unauthorized work in the high-security labs, according to the Army.

The scientist, whose name was not released, had previously been vaccinated against the disease and has no symptoms, said Army public affairs officer Chuck Dasey. That scientist and another who worked in the same building but who tested negative for exposure are both taking antibiotics as a precaution, Dasey said.

Officials remain uncertain how the spores escaped from the laboratory inside Building 1425, where the bacteria were the subject of ongoing experiments.

The Army would not characterize the nature of the experiments except to say they involved "biodefense" and were unrelated to the FBI investigation into last fall's terrorist mailings of anthrax spores.

Suspicions of trouble first arose April 8, when the two scientists noticed some liquid and dried deposits on the outside of a flask in the biosafety level 3 lab, a highly secure sealed lab used for dangerous pathogens.

Normally, Dasey said, such liquids and powders would be expected to be better contained.

In addition to testing the two scientists for exposure to the bacteria, dozens of environmental tests were conducted to check for the presence of spores in adjacent rooms and hallways. Results arrived Thursday and two were positive -- one in an administrative room adjacent to the lab in the research building and one in a nearby hallway, Dasey said. Yesterday, about 100 employees were moved out of the building so that more extensive environmental testing and decontamination procedures could be initiated.

Dasey said the anthrax studies underway at the lab were not classified. He said he did not know whether the strain under study was the so-called Ames strain used in last fall's attacks, which killed five people and sickened more than a dozen others.

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## **Millions were in germ war tests**

Much of Britain was exposed to bacteria sprayed in secret trials

**Antony Barnett, public affairs editor**

**Observer**

**Sunday April 21, 2002**

The Ministry of Defence turned large parts of the country into a giant laboratory to conduct a series of secret germ warfare tests on the public.

A government report just released provides for the first time a comprehensive official history of Britain's biological weapons trials between 1940 and 1979.

Many of these tests involved releasing potentially dangerous chemicals and micro-organisms over vast swaths of the population without the public being told.

While details of some secret trials have emerged in recent years, the 60-page report reveals new information about more than 100 covert experiments.

The report reveals that military personnel were briefed to tell any 'inquisitive inquirer' the trials were part of research projects into weather and air pollution.

The tests, carried out by government scientists at Porton Down, were designed to help the MoD assess Britain's vulnerability if the Russians were to have released clouds of deadly germs over the country.

In most cases, the trials did not use biological weapons but alternatives which scientists believed would mimic germ warfare and which the MoD claimed were harmless. But families in certain areas of the country who have children with birth defects are demanding a public inquiry.



One chapter of the report, 'The Fluorescent Particle Trials', reveals how between 1955 and 1963 planes flew from north-east England to the tip of Cornwall along the south and west coasts, dropping huge amounts of zinc cadmium sulphide on the population. The chemical drifted miles inland, its fluorescence allowing the spread to be monitored. In another trial using zinc cadmium sulphide, a generator was towed along a road near Frome in Somerset where it spewed the chemical for an hour.

While the Government has insisted the chemical is safe, cadmium is recognised as a cause of lung cancer and during the Second World War was considered by the Allies as a chemical weapon.

In another chapter, 'Large Area Coverage Trials', the MoD describes how between 1961 and 1968 more than a million people along the south coast of England, from Torquay to the New Forest, were exposed to bacteria including *e.coli* and *bacillus globigii*, which mimics anthrax. These releases came from a military ship, the Icewhale, anchored off the Dorset coast, which sprayed the micro-organisms in a five to 10-mile radius. The report also reveals details of the DICE trials in south Dorset between 1971 and 1975. These involved US and UK military scientists spraying into the air massive quantities of *serratia marcescens* bacteria, with an anthrax simulant and phenol.

Similar bacteria were released in 'The Sabotage Trials' between 1952 and 1964. These were tests to determine the vulnerability of large government buildings and public transport to attack. In 1956 bacteria were released on the London Underground at lunchtime along the Northern Line between Colliers Wood and Tooting Broadway. The results show that the organism dispersed about 10 miles. Similar tests were conducted in tunnels running under government buildings in Whitehall.

Experiments conducted between 1964 and 1973 involved attaching germs to the threads of spiders' webs in boxes to test how the germs would survive in different environments. These tests were carried out in a dozen locations across the country, including London's West End, Southampton and Swindon. The report also gives details of more than a dozen smaller field trials between 1968 and 1977.

In recent years, the MoD has commissioned two scientists to review the safety of these tests. Both reported that there was no risk to public health, although one suggested the elderly or people suffering from breathing illnesses may have been seriously harmed if they inhaled sufficient quantities of micro-organisms.

However, some families in areas which bore the brunt of the secret tests are convinced the experiments have led to their children suffering birth defects, physical handicaps and learning difficulties.

David Orman, an army officer from Bournemouth, is demanding a public inquiry. His wife, Janette, was born in East Lulworth in Dorset, close to where many of the trials took place. She had a miscarriage, then gave birth to a son with cerebral palsy. Janette's three sisters, also born in the village while the tests were being carried out, have also given birth to children with unexplained problems, as have a number of their neighbours.

The local health authority has denied there is a cluster, but Orman believes otherwise. He said: 'I am convinced something terrible has happened. The village was a close-knit community and to have so many birth defects over such a short space of time has to be more than coincidence.'

Successive governments have tried to keep details of the germ warfare tests secret. While reports of a number of the trials have emerged over the years through the Public Records Office, this latest MoD document - which was released to Liberal Democrat MP Norman Baker - gives the fullest official version of the biological warfare trials yet.

Baker said: 'I welcome the fact that the Government has finally released this information, but question why it has taken so long. It is unacceptable that the public were treated as guinea pigs without their knowledge, and I want to be sure that the Ministry of Defence's claims that these chemicals and bacteria used were safe is true.'

The MoD report traces the history of the UK's research into germ warfare since the Second World War when Porton Down produced five million cattle cakes filled with deadly anthrax spores which would have been dropped in Germany to kill their livestock. It also gives details of the infamous anthrax experiments on Gruinard on the Scottish coast which left the island so contaminated it could not be inhabited until the late 1980s.

The report also confirms the use of anthrax and other deadly germs on tests aboard ships in the Caribbean and off the Scottish coast during the 1950s. The document states: 'Tacit approval for simulant trials where the public might be exposed was strongly influenced by defence security considerations aimed obviously at restricting public knowledge. An important corollary to this was the need to avoid public alarm and disquiet about the vulnerability of the civil population to BW [biological warfare] attack.'

Sue Ellison, spokeswoman for Porton Down, said: 'Independent reports by eminent scientists have shown there was no danger to public health from these releases which were carried out to protect the public.'

'The results from these trials\_ will save lives, should the country or our forces face an attack by chemical and biological weapons.'

Asked whether such tests are still being carried out, she said: 'It is not our policy to discuss ongoing research.'



Washington Post

April 22, 2002

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## Debate Over Nuclear Lab Security Heats Up

By Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, Washington Post Staff Writers

The Department of Energy privately warned White House officials in late March that it lacked the funds to adequately protect the nation's nuclear weapons research facilities shortly after the administration had offered public assurances that security was more than adequate.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, concerns have mounted among lawmakers and terrorism experts about lax security at some of these weapons facilities, prompting congressional review.

The Energy Department's chief financial officer complained in a March 28 letter that the White House budget office had rejected a request for increased funding in the current fiscal year to provide for beefed up security at government research laboratories. The letter from Bruce M. Carnes warned that DOE was at "a critical juncture" and that its safeguards and security budget were not sufficient to meet the potential terrorism challenge.

"We are disconcerted that OMB refused our security supplemental request," Carnes said in a letter to Marcus Peacock, a senior official for the Office of Management and Budget. "This isn't a tenable position for you to take, in my view."

The letter was written two months after John A. Gordon, an undersecretary of energy and the administrator of the department's National Nuclear Security Administration, publicly declared that security precautions are strong at the nuclear research laboratories and along the network used to transport nuclear materials. He said allegations that the Energy Department had lax security at its nuclear weapons facilities "are false and misleading."

Gordon was responding to warnings from Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and a watchdog group that terrorist commandos could gain access to weapons-grade nuclear material and rapidly construct and detonate nuclear weapons because of grossly inadequate security at many of the nation's nuclear weapons research sites. According to a study last year by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), federal agents posing as "commandos" in mock exercises were able to breach security at nuclear laboratories more than half the time.

Yesterday, Markey released copies of the Carnes letter and called on President Bush and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham to address the security problem and explain Gordon's statements playing down security problems.

"The Administration has requested almost \$8 billion for missile defense, which won't do anything to prevent suicidal terrorists from attacking nuclear facilities and blowing up dirty bombs or homemade nuclear weapons," said Markey, a senior member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. "But when DOE finally admits that security is not what it should be, OMB refuses to help."

Amy Call, an OMB spokeswoman, said that after the Sept. 11 attacks, Congress approved a \$111 million supplement to the fiscal 2002 budget to enhance security at nuclear weapons laboratories. The White House is seeking an additional \$665 million for lab security and related expenses in the fiscal 2003 budget, she said. The Energy Department's recent request for more money remains under review, she said, while officials conduct a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerabilities of the facilities.

At the Energy Department, spokeswoman Lisa Cutler said that the letter from Carnes does not contradict Gordon because security at the facilities remains strong.

If the funding request continues to be denied, security needs will be met, "even if we have to shift priorities from another program in the department," Cutler said. "We believe our security is adequate and strong, and that our nuclear facilities are among the most secure facilities in the world and present a formidable challenge to any terrorist organization."

The U.S. nuclear weapons facilities managed by the Energy Department hold weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium in sufficient quantities to create nuclear devices. Many are near major metropolitan areas, such as Denver and San Francisco.

"I am concerned that a group of suicidal terrorists would not bother to attempt to steal nuclear weapons materials from these sites," Markey said in his letter to Bush. "Instead they would gain access to the nuclear materials located

within them by killing the security guard forces, and, once inside the facility, would construct and detonate dirty bombs or homemade nuclear bombs."

The internal administration dispute over security at the research laboratories stems from Abraham's March 14 request to OMB Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. for supplemental funding to cover both emergency responses to potential terrorist attacks and enhanced security at the facilities.

Neither OMB nor DOE officials would reveal how much additional money the Energy Department is seeking in fiscal 2002.

OMB agreed to ask Congress for additional funds for emergency responses, but it rejected the request for more money for security at the laboratories pending completion of a revision of the Design Basis Threat, a document that outlines the basis for physical security measures.

"We are not operating, and cannot operate under the pre-Sept. 11 Design Basis Threat," Carnes wrote to the OMB in March. "Until that is revised, we must operate under interim Implementing Guidance, and you have not provided resources to enable us to do so."

Earlier this month, Gordon again told reporters that government officials took a "hard look" at the safety of nuclear weapons facilities after Sept. 11 and that he was "pretty satisfied with where we are." He also reiterated his view that the sites would be difficult to strike and not highly attractive to terrorists.

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Defense Week

April 22, 2002

Pg. 1

## **Contractor Picked To Start Building Alaska Antimissile Site**

By Ann Roosevelt

The Army Corps of Engineers has awarded the first construction contract to build the infrastructure for a missile-defense site in Alaska.

At issue is the Bush administration's Alaska "test bed," a facility from which test interceptors will be launched and where, as soon as 2004, a small operational anti-missile force may be based.

The deal is worth up to \$250 million over three years to the winner, Fluor Alaska Inc. The company will build facilities at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Eareckson Air Force Station on Shemya Island, Alaska.

Construction at Eareckson will include buildings for the interceptor communication system data terminals and defense communication systems.

Similar work will be done at Ft. Greely, and will also include building a perimeter security fence; roads; a water supply building; main power substation; utility buildings; a fuel storage and unloading facility; utility buildings and an entry control station, the solicitation said. Also, the contractor will build a missile assembly building; an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle assembly building; a kill vehicle fuel storage facility; a kill vehicle oxidizer storage facility; and an interceptor storage building.

Construction of missile silos and the installation of missiles are the responsibility of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense prime contractor Boeing and not part of the construction contract, solicitation documents said. Boeing can do that work itself or subcontract it.

"We're on schedule and less than 900 days away from our target date of September '04 for that capability to be in place and to use it for ground integration testing," said Air Force Lt. Gen Ronald Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, in congressional testimony Wednesday, the day after the contract was awarded.

The test bed will be something like a simulation center, which would "enhance the use of data and increase statistical confidence in the missile defense program," said a Corps of Engineers' statement.

The infrastructure will allow the Missile Defense Agency to examine the operational concepts of its Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, which the agency says is designed to defend the United States by engaging threat missiles primarily through the descent phase of midcourse flight. The agency calls this "validation of operational concept," the statement said, by testing the interoperability of various components in a realistic environment.

### **Work starts in June**

Fluor Alaska was one of three companies bidding on the solicitation, which was issued Jan. 27 and closed Feb. 26.

The firm is a regional entity of Fluor Corp., said Lisa Boyette, a spokeswoman at the company's headquarters in Aliso Viejo, Calif. Fluor is one of the world's largest publicly owned engineering, procurement, construction, and maintenance-services organizations.

Fluor has been involved in Alaska for years, she said.

"Since the 1940s we've been involved in Alaska, in the Alyeska Pipeline, and right now are involved in a study on a proposed natural-gas pipeline from Alaska to the continental United States," she said.

The cost-plus-award-fee contract will be incrementally funded over a maximum of three years and includes amounts allotted for optional construction of a similar nature at other unidentified sites, the award said. There are no optional years written into the contract, which was awarded by the Corps' Engineering and Support Center contracting office in Huntsville, Ala.

"We expect the contractor to have four buildings "enclosed" that are critical to meeting occupancy dates specified in the contract so construction may continue from inside until next spring," the corps statement said.

Construction on the 260-acre site on Ft. Greely, and on a small area at Eareckson is expected to begin in June once site preparation is complete.

A detailed environmental assessment was prepared as required by law, and it found no significant impact. Following a 30-day public comment period, the finding was signed Tuesday—the last step before awarding the contract.

The construction timetable is limited by weather, and the construction season in that area of Alaska runs from April to October, a Corps spokesman said.

#### **Test-bed contingency**

The test bed will have battle-management and communication links to other sites as well as "five interceptors at this point, and possibly a spare, depending on what further analysis tells us," Kadish told the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The test bed will include prototype and surrogate elements to help in the development of missile defense elements and demonstrate an integrated layered missile defense—comprised of sensors, battle management and communications and interceptors. It will also host intercept flight tests and system integration tests.

"Our test infrastructure, in other words, will have an inherent, though rudimentary, operational capability," said Kadish in his prepared remarks.

Ft. Greely, established during World War II, later became a cold-weather test site for the Army. Under the base reduction and closure process, base activities were reduced and the active base was changed to caretaker status in 2000, though the Army and other services use the land for training.

The test bed is expected to be operational in September of 2004, Kadish told senators, as the tempo of the missile defense programs increases.

"I predict that the pace and the complexity of our testing is also picking up," he said. "We have 13 more flight tests scheduled for the remainder of this fiscal year of all types, 10 ground tests and 14 system wide tests and exercises."

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Washington Post

April 22, 2002

Pg. 16

## **Strife At Arms Watchdog Group**

THE HAGUE -- The head of a global body policing a chemical weapons ban refused to accede to a U.S. campaign to oust him over his attempts to woo Iraq into joining the organization and accept inspections.

The U.S. bid to oust the director of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the second such campaign since Washington succeeded last week in bringing about the replacement of the head of the U.N.'s climate advisory body.

The OPCW's director, Jose Bustani of Brazil, said he would not resign during a three-day special session of the organization that began yesterday. Bustani, who was unanimously reelected to a second four-year term last May, survived a no-confidence vote last month after Washington accused him of mismanagement because of his overtures to Iraq. A second vote is scheduled to take place behind closed doors on Tuesday.

**--Reuters**

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Aviation Week & Space Technology  
April 22, 2002

## Nuclear Agency Eyes New Designs, Controls

By Robert Wall, Washington

The U.S. nuclear weapons community is embarking on activities that could yield new designs and broaden efforts to stem the flow of non-weapons-grade radioactive materials.

The laboratories in charge of developing nuclear weapons have established a number of advanced concept groups who are supposed to foster thinking about how to leverage advances in technology. The technology incubators also serve as a mechanism to join seasoned design engineers with new talent to ensure that the existing knowledge base is handed off as older employees retire.

In 1994, Congress passed legislation barring the development of new nuclear weapons, and the groups will work within those constraints, according to John A. Gordon, director of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). But that doesn't mean changes in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal aren't materializing. The Pentagon has asked for a new nuclear penetrator weapon. Gordon said the improved device would merely involve repackaging existing components, and therefore shouldn't be considered a "new" weapon.

The benefits of a nuclear-tipped bomb are that it can damage underground facilities that lie deeper or are more hardened than a conventional penetrator. According to intelligence community estimates, the number of such structures has grown to more than 1,400. Conventional and nuclear-tipped bombs have the same penetration capability, but the shock wave from a nuclear device can affect targets beyond the reach of a conventional explosive. In cases where a conventional bomb can penetrate a hardened or underground structure, a thermobaric weapon--warheads that produce high, sustained blast pressure in a confined space--would probably suffice, Gordon said.

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE Review concluded that the B61-11 penetrator was too limited. "With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of 10-20) than would the much larger yield surface burst," the report stated. However, it also noted that for very deep and large underground facilities a high-yield penetrator could be required to collapse the structure. Development of the penetrator, which would be in the 5,000-lb. class, is being bound by a U.S. nuclear test moratorium. "One of the requirements that goes to the labs on this program is that they do not propose anything that in their judgment requires an underground nuclear test to certify," Gordon said. Instead, certification would rely on sled and other tests to ensure the nuclear device withstood the high forces of an impact. If the structural integrity of the warhead and the arming, fuzing and firing mechanism can be verified through inert testing, that should suffice to introduce a weapon into inventory, Gordon indicated. A detailed test plan hasn't been developed yet, and work on the project is expected to run several years.

Other experts think nuclear weapon developers should consider designing more robust warheads. Past designs focused on being small, light and high yield, which led to "very sensitive" weapons, said John S. Foster, chairman of a panel that reviewed the U.S. nuclear stockpile. But in a world where testing is prohibited, warheads that aren't as fragile but also not as efficient may be of value, he argued.

Another project under scrutiny involves modifying high-yield nuclear weapons into lower yield ones by eliminating the secondary charge.

The Nuclear Posture Review also said the Pentagon and NNSA should reassess the need for live weapons testing to field a new design. Some experts also contend nuclear weapons need to be tested to verify the health of the current stockpile. But Gordon said "there's nothing we see in the weapons today that would drive us to a test in the immediate future."

But working on new and existing weapons is only one of several initiatives NNSA is engaged in. Officials also want to reduce the risk of proliferation of material that could be used for a radioactive dispersal weapon, a bomb that spreads the toxic material. Radioactive dispersal weapons wouldn't kill large numbers of people, beyond the initial explosion, Gordon said, but cleanup would be difficult, as would convincing people an area is safe again.

Gordon believes Russia does a good job controlling weapons-grade substances, but he isn't as sanguine when it comes to non-weapons-grade material. "That's an area we are just starting to engage in," he said.

The U.S. hopes to enlist international support in financing a new control system. Costs could run several billion dollars and would come in addition to the money spent on the so-called Nunn-Lugar program that deals primarily

with weapons materials. Gordon said expenditures are reaching a level where it would be hard for Russia to absorb any more money to control weapons-grade material.

Gordon also addressed other issues the nuclear complex is wrestling with. Among them is a mounting infrastructure bill because past work was deferred. Modernization would cost about \$500 million a year over 10 years, he said.

One area where progress has been made is on the personnel front. He noted that retention and hiring problems are now abating. "We are attracting new, quality people" because of the leading-edge work being offered, he said.

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USA Today  
April 23, 2002  
Pg. 1

## **U.S. Is All Over The Map On Homeland Defense**

### ***Lack of money, direction and authority prevent states from developing plans to thwart or react to terrorism***

By Kevin Johnson, USA Today

OKLAHOMA CITY — During the first big test of Oklahoma's new homeland defense plan, Gov. Frank Keating and other top state officials huddled in a Capitol "war room" here to confront a horrific terrorism scenario: a smallpox outbreak in Tulsa.

The mock crisis was barely underway this month when the officials hit a roadblock. Before considering how to examine the spread of the highly contagious virus or whether to order a massive quarantine, officials spent 40 minutes debating colors. The Oklahomans weren't sure whether they should, or even could, have the U.S. government change the status of its new color-coded security alert system from yellow (which indicates there is a significant threat of a terrorist strike) to orange (which means there is a higher risk of attack).

"It seems pretty basic, but they didn't know where to go with it," says Michael Forgy, a manager in the Justice Department's Office of Domestic Preparedness. He says the officials should have dealt with life and death issues more quickly.

Besides highlighting the widespread confusion over the federal alert system, the Oklahoma drill symbolizes some of the problems that are frustrating state officials as they tackle a formidable task: Piecing together homeland defense programs in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Across the USA, state officials involved in such efforts are concerned about what they view as a lack of guidance from Washington. Typically, they also have little money, small staffs and widely varying views about what should be done first.

Seven months after President Bush tapped former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge to head the new national Office of Homeland Security and encouraged states to follow the federal government's lead, every U.S. state and territory has appointed its own security chief. But beyond that, the nation's new homeland defense programs are mostly talk. And many state officials say privately that Ridge's office hasn't moved quickly enough to help them set priorities.

Among the complications cited most often by state officials:

\*With a sluggish economy forcing most states to slash programs to balance their budgets, there isn't much money available for significant homeland security initiatives, or even to pay for office staff and equipment.

In many cases, states have decided not to commit any of their own money until the U.S. government begins distributing the \$3.5 billion it has promised to state and local security programs. The federal dollars won't start flowing until at least October.

There are no guarantees that the federal money will address some of the states' most pressing needs. This month, Keating says, Oklahoma officials were shocked to learn that Congress had not allocated any money for a radio communications system they say is critical to their plans to link local, state and federal authorities during crises. Much of the federal money is aimed at training those who would respond to biological, chemical or nuclear attacks.

\*Several states are hesitant to create new layers of bureaucracy for homeland defense because of the tight budgets, while others are uncertain about what authority such departments should be given.

In Texas, officials' resistance to form a new agency has put security planning in the hands of state Land Commissioner David Dewhurst, who doubles as the state's homeland security director. Dewhurst says he is running Texas' effort with five staff members he "borrowed" from the land office.

The state has provided about \$50,000 this year for the start-up effort. Dewhurst says that should be just enough to cover travel expenses for his staff to inspect a huge state that is rich in potential terrorism targets. High on the list of his concerns are the state's two nuclear power plants and the world's second-largest petro-chemical plant. Dewhurst says that protecting such critical resources in Texas will cost at least "several hundred million" dollars. He says he's counting on the U.S. government to pay most, if not all, of the tab.

#### **'No budget, no staff'**

In Oklahoma, the Legislature has been debating whether to form a new homeland security agency. The state's experience in dealing with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 put it ahead of most others in learning how to respond to major crises, but officials acknowledge that long-term planning is difficult without an established security office.

"I have no budget, no staff, no authority and complete responsibility," says Department of Public Safety Commissioner Bob Ricks, who also is the state's interim homeland security director. "The Legislature hasn't given me anything."

Ricks adds that he isn't certain whether state lawmakers will allow him to keep the security director's post permanently or whether they will appoint someone else.

"There is a lot of confusion out there about what kind of experience is suitable for this job," says state Sen. Dick Wilkerson, a Democrat from Atwood. "It's just such a huge job. I don't believe any state or political apparatus has recognized how important this effort is."

Wilkerson acknowledges that the state has provided Ricks "with barely a penny to work with."

"We're cutting budgets at every level," Wilkerson says. "It's going to be real hard to find several million dollars to make this work. In the end, do you take money from schools or roads?"

\*Although Ridge has promised to release a federal homeland security strategy this summer, some state officials and security analysts fear that public support for expensive security initiatives could wane unless governments move more quickly to establish such plans.

"The mission of this national effort and how it will integrate the states isn't entirely clear to me at all," says Dennis Reimer, director of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, a non-profit organization in Oklahoma City.

"I don't think we've come nearly as far as we need to," he says. "There is a danger of losing the momentum to pull together a plan to protect our people. We need to get on with it."

Forgy at the Justice Department agrees. "There is a sense that (the states are) stepping off in different directions," he says. "There is no standardization. Washington doesn't seem to have the best grip on it yet."

Ridge opens a two-day meeting today in Washington with all state security directors as part of his continuing effort to form a national strategy. Ridge spokeswoman Susan Neely says it is premature for states to express "anxiety" over a lack of progress by the U.S. government.

"Time is against us to a certain degree," Neely says. "But we have a long way to go. Every state has been asked to formulate plans of their own. Every state has different needs. There is no way for us to sit in Washington and know what is best in every state."

#### **State models vary widely**

For now, homeland security planning among the states is a patchwork process in which a few states seem to be marching toward a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy, and many others appear to be marking time. The models vary widely.

North Carolina has not created a homeland security office but has assigned anti-terrorism duties to various law enforcement agencies, set aside \$30 million from a "rainy day" fund so that agencies can improve security and created a state registry for companies that deal in biological agents that could be used in attacks.

In Louisiana, however, there is no new state money to support the start-up of a homeland security office. Training and emergency response planning is being done "in-house and out of hide," says Michael Brown, assistant director of the state's Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Brown says Louisiana officials delayed their security planning because "we waited on the federal government to provide some direction. When we didn't get it, we pressed our own concept forward" to form a statewide emergency response plan.

What authorities have found since is that the need for manpower, equipment and money vastly outstrips the available resources. Asked how prepared Louisiana is to deal with a local crisis, Brown says, "I won't even hazard a guess."

In Georgia, which security officials say is one of the better-organized states, Gov. Roy Barnes has authorized \$1 million to launch a new intelligence-gathering and analysis operation. But the state can't afford the centerpiece of its security plan: Recruiting and training regional crisis response teams to cover the state's 159 counties.

State officials still are examining how much the program would cost.

"It all can be done," said Maj. Tommy Brown, executive officer to Georgia Homeland Security Director Richard Hightower, who also is the state's public safety commissioner. "The biggest problem is getting some direction on when the money is going to come and what it will cover."

There is little question that federal support will determine whether local homeland initiatives succeed. Less clear is whether the U.S. government's system for funding security efforts will be an improvement from similar initiatives that bogged down before federal money could reach the states.

This month, several funding problems were highlighted in an internal Justice Department audit of domestic preparedness grants totaling \$243 million.

The audit found that the Justice grants program, separate from the Office of Homeland Defense, had failed to disburse more than half of its available money since 1998.

In most cases, Justice officials said, states did not submit the correct applications for the funds. The money had been set aside to buy protective clothing for emergency workers, decontamination kits and equipment to detect materials used in biological assaults.

### **'Frankenstein' syndrome**

Eileen Preisser, a professor of homeland and national security at the New Mexico Institute of Mines and Technology, warns that the varied progress among the states in establishing security plans has created a "Frankenstein monster syndrome."

"The states are grabbing what they can and sewing it all together," she says. "What happens, though, when you need it to work and it all collapses or spins out of control?"

Preisser, on loan to the U.S. government as an adviser on homeland security and technology matters, says federal authorities have provided states with few guidelines to ensure that officials are at least giving emergency workers similar levels of training.

"I have a lot of respect for Tom Ridge," Preisser says. "But until his office blesses some kind of national strategy, we're going to have people going off in all different directions."

As for the nation's overall preparedness to deal with a major terrorist incident, Preisser estimates a 50% chance of a successful response if the incident took place near where medical and emergency response teams are plentiful.

Beyond "those centers of excellence," Preisser says, the chances of overall success drop to about 10% in the event of a bioterrorist attack. "I hate to say it," she says, "but we're not prepared like we should be."

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Baltimore Sun

April 23, 2002

## **No Anthrax Threat Found At Army Lab**

By Scott Shane, Sun Staff

Extensive weekend testing at Fort Detrick after an accidental leak of anthrax spores from a laboratory found no new areas of dangerous contamination, spokesman Chuck Dasey said yesterday.

Further sampling in an office and corridor where anthrax was found last week did find two more anthrax spores, he said. Those areas are being disinfected with a bleach solution and will be reopened when they are safe, he said.

Workers who took swabs in 800 places inside the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases also found traces of another strain of anthrax, one that does not cause human disease and is used to make vaccines, Dasey said.

On April 8, a small amount of a virulent anthrax mixture spilled from a flask inside a lab at USAMRIID, the military's top biodefense research facility.

One of two workers in the area of the spill had a positive nasal swab test for anthrax exposure. Both workers were placed on antibiotics, though they had been vaccinated against the disease and probably were not in danger.

Workers taking swabs outside the lab last week found some anthrax spores in an adjoining office and corridor.

While the level of contamination was low, officials were concerned that any pathogens had escaped the controlled lab.

In addition to the two lab workers, 35 employees have now had nasal swabs. Their tests were all negative, Dasey said.



U.S. Sen. Mary L. Landrieu, a Louisiana Democrat who is chairwoman of a subcommittee on emerging threats, toured USAMRIID April 12 with six Senate staffers. They did not enter the contaminated areas and have been told they do not need to undergo testing or take antibiotics, said Maria Purdy, a spokeswoman for Landrieu.

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New York Times  
April 23, 2002

## **Qaeda Leader Said To Report A-Bomb Plans**

By Philip Shenon

WASHINGTON, April 22 — A top leader of Al Qaeda now in custody has told American interrogators that the terrorist group is close to building a crude nuclear device and may try to smuggle one into the United States, officials said tonight.

The officials cautioned that they remained highly suspicious about information from the captured terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, who was arrested last month in Pakistan.

Last week, information from Mr. Zubaydah, a Palestinian in his early 30's, caused the F.B.I. to issue a nationwide alert to banks about a possible terrorist attack.

The American officials, confirming reports tonight on CBS News and NBC News, said Mr. Zubaydah had told interrogators that Al Qaeda had been aggressively seeking to build a so-called dirty bomb, in which radioactive material is wrapped around a traditional explosive device.

One official said Mr. Zubaydah, believed to be Osama bin Laden's operations chief, "is well positioned to know what Al Qaeda has been up to, and we have to take his information seriously."

The official noted that the government had long warned about the possibility that Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups might be able to fashion a crude nuclear device and use it against American targets here or abroad.

Another official said, "Dirty bombs aren't that hard to make, unfortunately."

Still, officials said, Mr. Zubaydah might well be lying to interrogators either in hopes of lenient treatment or in hopes of creating panic.

"This could just be bragging," an official said. "It's impossible for us to know the truth at this point."

Mr. Zubaydah was captured in a shootout with the Pakistani police and intelligence agents in Faisalabad, where he and associates had taken up residence after fleeing Afghanistan. He is considered the most important member of Al Qaeda taken into custody since Sept. 11.

For several years, Mr. Zubaydah worked as Mr. bin Laden's chief recruiter for terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and he is widely believed to know the identities of Al Qaeda terrorists around the world, including members of so-called sleeper cells that may be poised for attacks.

His exact whereabouts have not been disclosed by the government, which cites security concerns. American officials insist that he is receiving high-quality medical treatment for gunshot wounds from his capture.

"We have very good reason to keep him alive," said one official.

Intelligence officials have reported for years that Al Qaeda has sought to buy nuclear materials, especially from the nations of the former Soviet Union, and to train its members into fashioning the material into crude bombs by wrapping it around traditional easy-to-obtain explosives.

Such a device would not necessarily kill large numbers of people, but intelligence officials say they believe that a dirty bomb would create extraordinary panic.

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## Homeland Security, State By State

Seven months after President Bush asked them to develop homeland defense programs, states have responded in a range of ways. Some have set aside money to begin planning; many others are awaiting further guidance from the federal government, which plans to distribute \$3.5 billion in security funding beginning in October. A look at what the states have done toward setting up homeland defense programs with their own money:

**Alabama:** No separate budget or staff. Funding for current activities is drawn from existing state agencies. A proposal to hire a full-time office staff of four employees is pending. Local National Guard troops have been activated for airport security. Contact: Brig. Gen. Michael H. Sumrall, (334) 271-7200, [www.governorpress.state.al.us/ex-63-2001-11-01.htm](http://www.governorpress.state.al.us/ex-63-2001-11-01.htm)

**Alaska:** No separate budget; two full-time employees. Officials have asked Legislature for \$26.5 million in state funding. State lawmakers are also considering requests to establish a separate office for homeland defense and plans to protect utilities and transportation systems. Officials are developing ways to detect biological attacks. Contact: Homeland Security Director Wayne Rush, (907) 428-7032, [www.state.ak.us/local/pr101701.html](http://www.state.ak.us/local/pr101701.html)

**Arizona:** No separate budget; 10 people assigned to oversee homeland security operations. State lawmakers are considering bills to add terrorist acts to list of state criminal offenses. Legislation also would give state law enforcement agencies broader authority to eavesdrop. Contact: Steve Jewetts, (602) 542-1302, [www.az.gov/webapp/portal/displaycontent.jsp?id=903&group=main](http://www.az.gov/webapp/portal/displaycontent.jsp?id=903&group=main)

**Arkansas:** No separate budget or staff. Support for homeland security activities is being drawn from existing employees in the state Department of Emergency Management. Officials are reviewing state's freedom of information law to guard against release of confidential information. Contact: Homeland Security Director Bud Harper, (510) 730-9750, [www.adem.state.ar.us](http://www.adem.state.ar.us)

**California:** No separate budget; three full-time staffers. Other support for homeland security activities is being drawn from existing resources at the National Guard, California Highway Patrol, Department of Health and Office of Emergency Services. Contact: Special advisor George Vinson, (916) 324-8908, [www.oes.ca.gov](http://www.oes.ca.gov)

**Colorado:** No separate budget; eight full-time staffers. The Legislature is reviewing how a security office should be established and funded. Contact: Sue Mencer, public safety executive director, (303) 273-1680, [www.cdpsweb.state.co.us](http://www.cdpsweb.state.co.us)

**Connecticut:** No separate budget or staff. Funding is drawn from existing public safety budget. Activities supported by existing public safety employees. Legislature is considering a plan to include acts of terrorism as state criminal offenses. Contact: Vincent De Rosa, deputy commissioner of Protective Services Division, (203)-805-6600, [www.state.ct.us/dps/ps/index.htm](http://www.state.ct.us/dps/ps/index.htm)

**Delaware:** No separate budget or staff. Funding is drawn from existing state agencies. Activities are supported by existing state employees. State lawmakers are considering a plan to develop a system for detecting biological and chemical attacks. They also are reviewing current laws to ensure that civil liberties are protected in terrorism cases. Contact: Homeland Security Director Phil Cabaud, (302) 744-4101, [www.state.de.us/dema/index.htm](http://www.state.de.us/dema/index.htm)

**D.C.:** Did not return calls seeking information.

**Florida:** State is providing \$3 million for startup of homeland security office. Staffing plan calls for 30 employees, a mix of law enforcement agents, government analysts and researchers. Officials are developing seven regional security task forces to coordinate state responses to biological threats, monitor terrorist groups and gather intelligence. Contact: Public Safety Commissioner Tim Moore, (850) 410-7001, [www.fdle.state.fl.us](http://www.fdle.state.fl.us)

**Georgia:** State is providing \$1 million startup budget for security office. Staffing plan calls for about 23 employees drawn from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Developing a separate intelligence network for collection and analysis of information in the effort to thwart future attacks. Contact: Public Safety Commissioner Robert Hightower, (404) 624-7030, [www.state.ga.us/gpstc](http://www.state.ga.us/gpstc)

**Hawaii:** No separate budget or staff. Activities largely supported by the National Guard. Legislature is considering plans to define missions of emergency response agencies in times of crisis. Contact: Maj. Gen. Edward Correa, (808) 733-4246, [www.scd.state.hi.us](http://www.scd.state.hi.us)

**Idaho:** No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies, including emergency management and hazardous materials employees. State lawmakers recently approved harsher penalties for weapons violators at local airports. Contact: Maj. Gen. Jack Kane, (208) 422-5242

**Illinois:** State is providing \$17 million as startup funding; no separate staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. The state is providing emergency training for local firefighters, upgrading agriculture and crime

laboratories, and purchasing emergency equipment. Contact: Homeland Security Director Matt Bettenhausen, (312) 814-2166, [www.state.il.us/iema](http://www.state.il.us/iema)

Indiana: State is providing about \$14 million from motor-vehicle fees to support homeland security work; no separate staff. Activities are coordinated by 19 employees from existing agencies. Legislature has approved anti-terrorism plan aimed at improving local airport security. Contact: Clifford Ong, Counter-Terrorism and Security Council director, (317) 232-8303, [www.in.gov/c-tasc](http://www.in.gov/c-tasc)

Iowa: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported by existing state agencies, including emergency management office. Legislature has passed measure to protect information about state assets. Contact: Emergency Management Administrator Ellen Gordon, (515) 281-3231, [www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/index.htm](http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/index.htm)

Kansas: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported primarily by local National Guard. Legislature is reviewing state law to determine preparedness for bioterrorist attack and other crisis-response issues. Contact: Maj. Gen. Greg Gardner, (785) 274-1121/1109, [www.ink.org/public/kdem](http://www.ink.org/public/kdem)

Kentucky: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing agencies. Legislature considering a plan to establish homeland security director as a permanent position. Contact: Homeland Security Director Ray Nelson, (502) 607-1257, [homeland.state.ky.us](http://homeland.state.ky.us)

Louisiana: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing agencies. Officials are developing a statewide response strategy involving state police and local National Guard. Contact: Adjutant Gen. Bennett Landreneau, (225) 342-7015

Maine: No separate budget; two full-time employees. Activities are supported by various state agencies. Pending legislation would create plans for medical quarantine during biological attacks. State criminal code now includes terrorist-related offenses. Contact: Maj. Gen. Joseph Tinkham II, (207) 626-4440.

Maryland: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies, including emergency management office. Legislature is considering a plan to create a Maryland Security Council to help coordinate activities. Contact: Al Collins, (410) 974-3570, [www.mema.state.md.us/programs\\_terrorism.html](http://www.mema.state.md.us/programs_terrorism.html)

Massachusetts: No separate budget; three full-time employees. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Lawmakers developing a package of anti-terrorism legislation. Contact: Richard Swensen, Office of Commonwealth Security, (617) 727-3600, ext. 556

Michigan: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported largely by state emergency management office. Contact: Homeland Security Director John Ort, (517) 336-6198, [www.msp.state.mi.us](http://www.msp.state.mi.us)

Minnesota: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported mainly by Department of Public Safety. State lawmakers considering a plan to create \$22 million fund for community security efforts. Anti-terrorism legislation is pending. Contact: Public Safety Commissioner Charlie Weaver, (651)-296-6642, [www.dps.state.mn.us/HomelandSecurity/index.htm](http://www.dps.state.mn.us/HomelandSecurity/index.htm)

Mississippi: No separate budget; three full-time employees. Other activities are supported by the state emergency management office. State lawmakers have approved tougher penalties for anthrax hoaxes and bomb threats. Contact: Robert Latham, emergency management director, (601) 960-9999, [www.memaorg.com](http://www.memaorg.com)

Missouri: No separate budget; three full-time employees. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Legislature will make recommendations for improving state security and emergency response. Contact: Col. Tim Daniel, homeland security director, (573) 522-3007, [www.homelandsecurity.state.mo.us](http://www.homelandsecurity.state.mo.us)

Montana: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing agencies and a 12-member task force. Contact: Disaster and Emergency Services Director Jim Greene, (406) 841-3911, [www.discoveringmontana.com/homelandsecurity/css/default.asp](http://www.discoveringmontana.com/homelandsecurity/css/default.asp)

Nebraska: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing agencies and a seven-person task force. Contact: Lt. Gov. Dave Heineman, (402)-471-2256.

Nevada: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported mainly by state emergency management office. Lawmakers are developing legislation for dealing with bioterrorism incidents. Contact: Emergency Management Division Director Frank Siracusa, (775) 687-4241.

New Hampshire: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by emergency management office. New legislation provides more authority for governor and health agencies during crises. Contact: Fire Marshal Don Bliss, emergency management director, (603) 271-2231, e-mail is [donbliss@compuserve.com](mailto:donbliss@compuserve.com)

New Jersey: \$4.2 million for current fiscal year goes toward counterterrorism initiative; 60 full-time staffers, including 25 state troopers. Lawmakers have approved anti-terrorism legislation and are considering plans that call for fingerprinting and background checks for airport employees. Contact: Kathy Flicker, assistant attorney general in charge of Office of Counter Terrorism (609) 341-5050, [www.state.nj.us/lps/dsptf/dsptfhome.html](http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dsptf/dsptfhome.html)

New Mexico: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported by existing agencies. Lawmakers considering plans to amend emergency management operations and guidelines for handling hazardous materials. Contact: George Dahl, state Department of Public Safety and Emergency Services and Security, (505) 476-9686.

New York: No separate budget; 16 full-time staffers whose activities are supported by existing state agencies. Governor has proposed \$200 million to fund various homeland security operations. Pending legislation would upgrade airport security and would call for mandatory background checks for all employees who work in airport gate areas. Contact: Public Security Director James Kallstrom, (212) 867-7060, [www.state.ny.us](http://www.state.ny.us)

North Carolina: State has set aside \$30 million for existing agencies to fund new security activities. No separate staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. New anti-terrorism package provides tougher penalties in cases involving weapons of mass destruction. State has created registry to track potentially dangerous biological agents in possession of government and industry. Contact: Department of Public Safety Secretary Bryan Beatty, (919) 733-2126, [www.ncgov.com/asp/subpages/safety\\_security.asp](http://www.ncgov.com/asp/subpages/safety_security.asp)

North Dakota: State has provided \$250,000 in startup funding for security efforts; no separate staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Contact: Homeland Security Director Doug Friez, (701) 328-8100, [state.nd.us/dem/homesec.html](http://state.nd.us/dem/homesec.html)

Ohio: No separate budget or staff. A 14-member task force organizes security efforts, drawing from existing agencies. Legislature has added terrorism offenses to state criminal code and has toughened penalties for those convicted in hoax cases. Contact: Lt. Gov. Maureen O'Connor, (614) 644-0957, [www.ohiopublicsafety.com](http://www.ohiopublicsafety.com)

Oklahoma: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported mainly by Department of Public Safety. Officials are developing a statewide emergency response strategy. Plan breaks the state into 15 regions and calls for recruiting up to 360 firefighters and other emergency response personnel. Contact: Department of Public Safety Commissioner Bob Ricks, (405) 425-2001.

Oregon: No separate budget; six state law enforcement officials are assigned to coordinate homeland defense efforts. Legislature has approved a plan to provide emergency assistance to neighboring states during crises. Contact: State Police Superintendent Ronald Ruecker, (503) 378-3725, [www.governor.state.or.us](http://www.governor.state.or.us)

Pennsylvania: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported by existing state agencies. Lawmakers considering plan that would provide \$200 million to support homeland security. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Officials developing statewide tracking systems to analyze intelligence and detect biological agents. Contact: Earl Freilino (717) 651-2715, [www.homelandsecurity.state.pa.us](http://www.homelandsecurity.state.pa.us)

Rhode Island: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported by existing state agencies, including fire marshal, emergency management office and health department. Contact: Maj. Gen. Reginald Centracchio, (401) 275-4102, [www.state.ri.us/riema/terror.htm](http://www.state.ri.us/riema/terror.htm)

South Carolina: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported by existing state agencies. State lawmakers considering proposals to give authorities broader wiretapping authority and more access to suspects' financial records. Contact: Homeland Defense Director, Steve Siegfried, (803) 737-3886, [www.state.sc.us/homeland/index.html](http://www.state.sc.us/homeland/index.html)

South Dakota: No separate budget; two full-time and six part-time staffers. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. State lawmakers have added terrorism-related offenses to criminal code and have expanded health department officials' authority during crises. Contact: Homeland Defense Director Deb Bowman, (605) 773-7040.

Tennessee: State has set aside \$10 million for startup homeland defense costs and related law enforcement activities; four full-time employees. Activities are supported by existing agencies. Contact: Homeland Defense Director Wendell Gilbert, (615) 532-7825, [www.state.tn.us/homelandsecurity](http://www.state.tn.us/homelandsecurity)

Texas: No separate budget or staff. State has provided about \$50,000 to cover travel expenses for homeland security director. Activities are supported by existing agencies, including the state land office. Officials are discussing a strategy for protecting nuclear power stations, nuclear weapons assembly plant and petrochemical facilities. Contact: Texas Land Commissioner David Dewhurst, (512) 463-5256.

Utah: State has provided nearly \$300,000 in startup funding; 19 full-time employees. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Legislature has approved plan that defines authorities for homeland defense operations. Contact: Steve DeMille, deputy director of homeland defense, (801) 957-8630, [www.cem.utah.gov](http://www.cem.utah.gov)

Vermont: No separate budget; three full-time staffers. Activities are supported by existing agencies. Lawmakers are considering a proposal for \$350,000 in state money to fund startup of homeland security program. Contact: Civil and Military Affairs Secretary Kate O'Connor, (802) 828-3333

Virginia: No separate budget; four full-time employees. Activities are supported by existing state agencies. Lawmakers are considering a plan to include terrorism-related offenses in state criminal code. Officials have established a military advisory council. Contact: John Hager, assistant to the governor, (804) 225-3826, [www.vdem.state.va.us](http://www.vdem.state.va.us)

Washington: No separate budget or staff. Activities supported by existing state agencies. Pending legislation outlines statewide strategy to respond to crises. Contact: Maj. Gen. Tim Lowenberg, (253) 512-8201.

West Virginia: State has provided \$1.6 million for homeland security and to cover increased security costs since Sept. 11. No separate staff. Activities supported by existing state agencies. Lawmakers have stiffened penalties for terrorism-related hoaxes. They also have allowed Department of Transportation enforcement agents to carry weapons. Contact: Homeland Defense Director Joe Martin, (304) 558-2930.

Wisconsin: No separate budget or staff. Activities are supported mainly by state emergency management office. Legislation pending to broaden authority for state health officials during crises. Contact: Emergency Management Administrator Ed Gleason, (608) 242-3239, [www.wisconsin.gov/state/core/domestic\\_prep.html](http://www.wisconsin.gov/state/core/domestic_prep.html)

Wyoming: No separate budget; four full-time staffers. Activities are supported by existing state agencies and an advisory panel. Lawmakers have approved a plan to create a victims' compensation fund. Contact: Attorney General Hoke Macmillan, (307) 777-5457, [attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/ctc.htm](http://attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/ctc.htm)

*Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures and USA TODAY research by Lori Joseph and Kevin Johnson*

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St. Louis Post-Dispatch

April 21, 2002

## Posse Comitatus Allows Numerous Exceptions Today

By Harry Levins

The first exception to the Posse Comitatus Act begins just two words into the law itself, which reads (emphasis added):

"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1885)

The Defense Department's top lawyer agrees with Sen. John Warner, R-Va., that under the exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act is waived for :

- \* Constitutional exceptions like suppressing insurrections. Indeed American history teems with examples of federal soldiers sent to quell riots and disorders, like the Los Angeles riots of 1992. Federal soldiers have also enforced desegregation orders, as in Little Rock, Ark., in the 1950s.

- \* The Coast Guard. As Lt. Chris O'Neill of the Coast Guard's St. Louis office puts it, "We're a regulatory agency, unlike the other armed forces. And when we enforce regulations, we're enforcing federal laws -- for example, on safety. We also do things closer to what most people think of as law enforcement -- drug interdiction, for example. We can make arrests while enforcing federal laws. But arrests are the exception, because we have so many other tools in the toolbox."

- \* The Navy and Marine Corps, although as a matter of policy, the Defense Department holds those two services to the Posse Comitatus Act. (The Army is the branch singled out in the original law of 1878. The law now applies to the Air Force too, because until 1947, the Air Force was a part of the Army.)

- \* The National Guard in its role as a state militia.

- \* Such purely military actions as policing military bases or flying patrols over U.S. cities.

- \* Congressionally authorized missions -- for example, supporting anti-drug programs along America's borders, approved in 1981. The armed forces can help law-enforcement agencies but are barred from taking part in searches, seizures, arrests and the like. Congress also authorized the armed forces in 1974 to pitch in after such natural disasters as hurricanes and earthquakes.

Other scholars note statutory exceptions for:

- \* Emergencies involving nuclear material and biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

- \* Civilians on the military payroll -- for example, the security guards found at many military bases.

- \* Military people protecting the president and other federal officials.

The Posse Comitatus Act ran into three court tests in the 1970s, after a standoff between federal authorities and Indian activists at Wounded Knee, S.D. The courts said military participation was OK if:

1. The military role was passive -- that is, if it was limited to such acts as providing training and equipment.

2. That role never "pervaded the activities" of civilian authorities.

3. The armed forces refrained from flexing military power that was "regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory."

In all three cases, the courts ruled that the armed forces had stayed within the rules.  
In fact, in the 124-year history of the Posse Comitatus Act, nobody has ever been convicted of violating it.

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Los Angeles Times  
April 21, 2002

## **Scientists Weigh In With Deductions On Anthrax Killer** ***Terrorism: Their theories on the attacks range from a disgruntled researcher to a covert government project gone awry to right-wing extremists.***

By Johanna Neuman, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- Microbiologists, like nature, abhor a vacuum, and in the absence of an FBI arrest in last fall's anthrax attacks, some of the nation's top scientists are offering their own theories.

In memos making their way around the Internet and in hallway conversations at professional conferences, leading scientists--many fearful that an unsolved case will only encourage other bioterrorists--are applying their deductive reasoning to the anthrax-laced letters that killed five people and spread a new level of fear about biological warfare. Their theories are full of intrigue: A disgruntled scientist. A covert government project gone awry. An accomplice to the Sept. 11 hijackers who stayed behind to mail the letters after their planes hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Right-wing extremists stockpiling the deadly material in anticipation of a visit from the Internal Revenue Service. "We all have our pet theories," said Jason Pate, a bioterrorism expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "But none seems to fit the facts exactly."

The FBI has been working aggressively on the case, conducting thousands of interviews and hundreds of lab tests in consultation with some of the world's top scientific experts and in concert with the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other agencies.

Some scientists applaud the effort--crediting agents with catching on quickly to the complexities of microbiology. But others, led by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg of Purchase College, State University of New York, think the FBI has been, as she put it, "dragging its feet."

They are scornful of an FBI e-mail sent to 32,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology in January--three months after the attacks stopped--asking scientists for their help in locating the culprit, possibly a loner with access to an American lab. They wonder why the FBI outreach came so late, and so broadly, when the number of scientists with expertise and access to anthrax materials is probably closer to 200.

For its part, the FBI privately takes a dim view of the armchair speculation. Mindful of their own mistakes in accusing scientist Wen Ho Lee of spying in 1999 and Richard Jewell in the Atlanta Olympics bombing in 1996, the FBI is eager to get this one right.

But many of the scientists upset with the FBI are passionate campaigners against the dangers of biological weapons. They have devoted their careers to studying sarin gas, anthrax and chemical weapons--and the cults and terrorists who might use them. They fear the anthrax killer might turn into another Unabomber, a malcontent who for 17 years intermittently used the U.S. mail to send bombs to academics and executives he deemed enemies. Every day that passes without an arrest, they think, sends a dangerous message to those who might consider using bioterrorism.

"A taboo was broken here," warned Rosenberg, a molecular biologist and professor of environmental science.

"Someone else might think they could get away with this too."

Steven M. Block, professor of biological sciences and applied physics at Stanford University, agreed that the stakes are bigger than catching one culprit.

"The fundamental question here is, are we victims of our own anthrax, or our own expertise, or is this a further fallout from Al Qaeda?" he said. "It's a critical question. This is the first biological warfare of the 21st century, and our proper response to it--morally, politically and in every other way--depends on our understanding which it is." Rosenberg began the scientific sleuthing in February when she posted an article on the Web site of the Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/bwc>, for which she has directed a panel on bioweapons for the last 10 years. In the article, she writes that the anthrax discovered in the letters mailed to two U.S. senators was so refined that it contained 1 trillion spores per gram, characteristic of the "weaponized" anthrax made by U.S. defense labs. Given the technical expertise required to produce that kind of anthrax, and the small universe of scientists with that knowledge, Rosenberg estimates that perhaps fewer than 40 people could be suspects.

She believes that the perpetrator is one of her own: a disgruntled American scientist.

"He must be angry at some biodefense agency," she writes. "He is driven to demonstrate, in a spectacular way, his capabilities and the government's inability to respond."

At the heart of her case is a conspiracy theory, a conviction that the slowness of the investigation can be explained only by some big secret that the government wants to keep hidden for as long as possible.

"He is cocksure that he can get away with it," she writes of the perpetrator. "Does he know something that he believes to be sufficiently damaging to the United States to make him untouchable by the FBI?"

The BBC cited Rosenberg in a news report this month suggesting that there could have been a secret government program to test the practicalities of sending anthrax through the mail. "Some very expert field person might have been asked to investigate the consequences of mailing anthrax and it would have been left to him to decide exactly how to carry it out," she said. "The result might have been a project gone badly awry if he decided to use it for his own purposes."

The FBI fumes at any suggestion it would deliberately sit on evidence, pointing out that it arrested one of its own, agent-turned-spy Robert Philip Hanssen, as soon as it learned of his betrayal.

Still, while not ruling out any theories, the FBI's own public profile of the anthrax killer sounds a lot like Rosenberg's.

In its e-mail January to microbiologists, the FBI asked them to be on the lookout for a loner. "The perpetrator might be described as 'standoffish' and likely prefers to work in isolation as opposed to a group/team setting. It is possible this person used off-hours in a laboratory or [borrowed] equipment to produce the anthrax."

But the evidence points in a different direction for two theorizing medical professionals: Tara O'Toole and Thomas V. Inglesby of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies.

Assessing a medical case in Florida, in which one of the Sept. 11 hijackers sought treatment for a leg wound in June, O'Toole and Inglesby concluded that the skin lesion might have been caused by anthrax. That was the conclusion too of the attending physician, Christos Tsonas of Holy Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale, but it was reached only after reviewing his notes taken while treating Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi for what appeared to be a simple, if unusual, leg injury.

In a two-page memo for the FBI, O'Toole and Inglesby said the anthrax diagnosis was "the most probable and coherent interpretation of the data available."

The FBI says that there are no blood tests, cultures or pictures that would help resolve the Florida case. While it does not rule out any leads, the FBI leans toward the theory of a domestic terrorist. But O'Toole argues that to believe that someone other than the hijackers and their accomplices hatched the anthrax plot would be to accept a lot of coincidences.

Haznawi lived with other hijackers in Boca Raton, Fla., the same city where the first anthrax victim worked.

Exposure to anthrax can cause black skin lesions like the one on Haznawi's leg. And Mohamed Atta, another hijacker, visited Belle Glade State Municipal Airport, north of Fort Lauderdale, to look at crop-dusting equipment, possibly as a conveyance for biological agents.

To analysts like Pate of the Monterey Institute, the improbability of so many coincidences "makes your eyebrows go up."

But Pate, manager of a terrorism task force at the institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, has his own theory. He says American right-wing extremists are plausible suspects.

The anti-government cliques, wary of official agencies and with a fascination for biological agents, tend to stockpile such weapons, he said.

Pate's theory could explain the targets of the anthrax letters--two liberal Democratic senators (Majority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont) and the news media (CBS, NBC and the New York Post)--all hated by the fringe cults.

Some question whether the armchair sleuths have more than cursory knowledge of the case.

"I think that Barbara Hatch Rosenberg and Tara O'Toole may both be guilty of some degree of over-speculation," said one researcher who did not want to offend his colleagues by being named.

Still, given the similarities between the mind-set of scientists and detectives, the urge to speculate may be irresistible.

"Dr. Rosenberg thinks it's a disgruntled worker conspiracy. Drs. O'Toole and Inglesby think it's Sept. 11 accomplices. I think it's some right-wing extremists," Pate said. "But maybe it's a disgruntled right-wing extremist scientist accomplice."

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## **Anthrax Patients' Ailments Linger**

### ***Fatigue, Memory Loss Afflict Most Survivors of October Attacks***

By Lena H. Sun, Washington Post Staff Writer

Six months after inhaling anthrax spores, several of the mail workers who survived the deadly disease have yet to make a full recovery and are experiencing serious fatigue and memory loss.

In interviews with five of the six survivors of inhalational anthrax, four spoke of frequent exhaustion. Only one person, a 74-year-old Florida man, has returned to work. But others said they require daily naps after the slightest exertion. They and their families say they have also noticed marked problems with memory and concentration.

"The question is, why aren't these people back to normal?" said Mark Galbraith, an infectious disease specialist in Virginia who is treating one of the victims.

The extent of the problems has highlighted for Galbraith and other physicians how little is known by the medical community about this illness and the potency of the toxins.

Eleven Americans, from Florida to Connecticut, contracted the inhaled form of anthrax after a rash of terrorist mailings to politicians and media outlets. Five died, including two postal workers from the Brentwood Road NE mail processing center in Washington. Six were treated and survived; of those, three live in the Washington area. "I'm just so tired," said David Hose, 59, of Winchester, Va., who was released from the hospital in November after 16 days of intensive treatment. Hose worked at the State Department's diplomatic mail facility in Sterling, where, investigators believe, he inhaled anthrax spores from a letter addressed to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) that was accidentally routed to the facility. He is trying to regain his strength through physical therapy but spends most of his time watching television because he has little energy to do much else, he says.

Bradley Perkins, the top anthrax expert at the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, said in a telephone interview this week that the CDC is aware of "complaints and concerns" among some of the inhalation survivors. The CDC is not currently conducting any systematic study of their health, he said, except for collecting blood samples to develop better vaccines.

"We're just now approaching the kind of time period where one would normally expect a full recovery," he said. But "a number of survivors have not returned to their normal daily activities.

"We have concern about the level" of their recovery, he added, and the CDC is "actively discussing" whether to conduct a formal study of their symptoms.

Perkins said memory loss and fatigue could be results of the infection. Anthrax produces toxins, "and some could have impact on nerve tissues," he said. It is also possible that survivors are experiencing some form of post-traumatic stress syndrome, he added.

Until the outbreak last year, inhalational anthrax was almost always fatal. Consequently, little is known about the experience of survivors and whether the infection has long-term effects.

The recent inhalational cases are unlike the other few dozen recorded in the United States in the last half-century, most of which were contracted by workers exposed to contaminated animal hides.

Medical experts know that severe illness can have unexpected emotional consequences in addition to physical effects. That could be particularly true in this case, because the anthrax attacks were an act of terrorism accompanied by intense media attention. Also, no one has been arrested in the attacks, which may cause the survivors more stress.

Leroy Richmond, 57, one of two Brentwood postal workers to survive inhalational anthrax, discovered by talking with a postal worker in New Jersey that he was not the only survivor having memory problems. Norma Wallace, 57, who worked in a facility in Hamilton Township, N.J., and was hospitalized with inhalational anthrax for 18 days, told him that she would often lose her train of thought in the middle of a conversation.

Richmond's wife, Susan, had noticed the same thing in her husband. "We know he's getting old," she said, "but it's not normal for him, in the middle of a conversation, to say he can't remember what the questions were."

Until he talked to Wallace, Richmond says, he was reluctant to acknowledge that he was having memory trouble. "I was trying to be brave and strong," he said. On his doctor's orders, Richmond is now undergoing a series of memory tests.

The other Brentwood postal employee who survived inhalational anthrax, a man in his fifties, wishes to remain unidentified, said a spokeswoman for the U.S. Postal Service.

The only survivor who appears to have made a full recovery is Ernesto Blanco, 74, who returned in February to his job handling mail for American Media Inc. at its new office building in Boca Raton, Fla.

"I feel good," Blanco said in an interview. He said he has not experienced fatigue or memory problems. "I remember everything. I feel 100 percent fine. Honest to God, you won't believe me, but I almost feel better than before."

The five other survivors, however, are recovering at home, receiving a portion of their pay in worker's compensation benefits. Unlike the families of those who died or were injured in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York, at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania, the anthrax survivors and their families have received limited or no financial assistance from private charities.

Richmond says he wants to go back to his Postal Service job as soon as his doctor says he is ready. On his doctor's orders, he takes a walk each morning, but he needs to stop halfway through at a nearby gas station to rest. After returning home, "I'm so tired I have to take a nap," he said.

Postal worker Wallace, of Willingboro, N.J., said she has to do her chores in 20-minute segments so she can rest. Wallace believes she breathed anthrax spores that were in at least one of three tainted letters officials say passed through the Hamilton Township facility.

Like some of the other survivors, she also has joint pain -- in her shoulders, ankles and hips -- that was not present before the illness. She doesn't know when she will be able to go back to work, but she has resumed her correspondence classes for a bachelor's degree in literature because she thinks it might help her memory.

"That's one reason why I stick with school," she said. "It forces me to focus and try to remember."

Wallace's co-worker Jyotsna Patel, of Princeton Junction, N.J., also has chronic fatigue, joint pain and memory loss. Before she got sick, she said, "my joints never hurt, and I never sit down for one minute -- I'm so active." This spring, her doctor told her, "Hey, you also have the same symptoms like the other patients," recalled her husband, Ramesh Patel.

She was hospitalized for only eight days and did not receive an inhalational anthrax diagnosis until the day she was discharged. When she first returned home, her husband said, she would often wake up in the middle of the night screaming from nightmares. The nightmares still occur, but less often, he said.

"The frustration is she is not getting better at the rate she should be," he said, adding that he is worried she might have suffered permanent damage. But what makes him "really mad," he said, is that "they still haven't been able to find out who did this."

*Staff writer David Brown contributed to this report.*

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Pacific Stars and Stripes  
April 20, 2002

## **U.S. Military To Help S. Korea With World Cup Security**

By Jan Wesner Childs and Jennifer Svan, Stars and Stripes

The United States will have two Navy ships, AWACS planes and an Army biological weapons defense unit providing security for South Korea during the upcoming World Cup.

"Our focus is in support of the Republic of Korea military's effort to ensure that the games are not only successful but also secure," said Army Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, U.S. Forces Korea's assistant chief of staff for operations. Miller is coordinating U.S. military support for the soccer tournament in Korea. Games will be played across the country throughout June. Games also will be played in Japan.

U.S. Forces Japan is in close coordination with the Japanese National Police and other government agencies about World Cup security measures, according to Air Force Col. Jack Ivy, USFJ spokesman.

USFJ, however, will not assist Japan with security during the games, he said.

"Japan is taking event security very seriously and has effective plans in place to deal with event security issues," he said.

The United States and South Korea signed a memorandum of agreement to cooperate on security, search and rescue, and medical evacuations during the games.

The Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft will patrol the skies, conducting airborne surveillance and acting as command and control centers.

The Army's Biological Integrated Detection System, known as BIDS, can detect biological weapons or hazards in the air.

The ships — a cruiser and a destroyer — can launch guided missiles.

For security reasons, Miller would not provide specific numbers of personnel involved or names of units and ships participating, other than to say that the ships are from the 7th Fleet and the AWACS are based in Japan.

The 7th Fleet is headquartered at Yokosuka Naval Base near Tokyo. The only AWACS in Japan are based at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa.

The ships and planes will start arriving in South Korea in the middle of May and stay until the World Cup games are over at the end of June.

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